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FLORIDA LIMITS POLICY DEVELOPMENT THROUGH
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION AND REQUIRES
INDEXING AND AVAILABILITY OF AGENCY ORDERS
PATRICIA A. DoRE*
I. INTRODUCTION
W HEN the Legislature revised chapter 120 in 1974, it put in place
a complex rulemaking process for state agencies. It did not,
however, expressly require the agencies to use the rulemaking process
to formalize policy positions into rules before applying the policies in
individual cases. The initial judicial reaction was to force rulemaking
by permitting a person against whom unadopted policy was being ap-
plied to challenge the validity of the policy in a section 120.56' rule
validity challenge proceeding. If the policy was found to be a rule
within the meaning of the definition of that term in 120.52(16), and if
it had not been adopted as a rule following 120.54 rulemaking proce-
dures, then the policy was invalidated and could not be used as a basis
for agency action until it was properly adopted. 2
Not long afterward, an exception was created in McDonald v. De-
partment of Banking and Finance.3 There, the court allowed agencies
to apply incipient, emerging, nonrule policy that had not been
adopted by rulemaking. The idea was to allow agencies to develop
policies on a case-by-case basis until they had enough knowledge and
experience to formalize the policy into rules.4 Before long, however,
the limited McDonald exception swallowed the rule. Instead of inquir-
ing into the extent of an agency's knowledge and experience with its
nonrule policy to determine whether the nonrule policy was truly in-
cipient and emerging, the courts allowed the agencies themselves to
decide whether and when they were ready to proceed to rulemaking.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University; B.A., 1966, Carlow College;
J.D., 1969, Duquesne University; LL.M., 1970, Yale University.
I. Because the provisions of chapter 120 are commonly referred to by number only, the
word "section" will not appear in many subsequent references to chapter 120.
2. Department of Admin. v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d 290 (Fla. Ist DCA 1977).
3. 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
4. Id. at 581.
5. See City of Tallahassee v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 433 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1983);
Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1980); Florida
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Indiantown Tel. Sys., Inc., 435 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Anheu-
ser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Bus. Reg., 393 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
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Because the courts were not inclined to police the exercise of agency
discretion in this area and the agencies were not interested in losing
their discretion, legislative action was necessary to restore some bal-
ance between adjudication and rulemaking in the process of policy de-
velopment.
At all times since the 1974 revision of chapter 120, agencies have
been required to "make available for public inspection and copying
• * * [a]ll agency orders [and a] current subject-matter index, identify-
ing for the public any rule or order issued or adopted after January 1,
1975."6 As an interim project between the 1988 and 1989 legislative
sessions, the staff of the Senate Governmental Operations Committee
was directed to study agency compliance with the chapter's require-
ments relating to the availability of agency orders and current subject
matter indexes for public inspection. The staff report confirmed what
people working with administrative law in this State already knew-
subject matter indexes were not being maintained in a useful manner
by most agencies, and the availability of individual agency orders was
a hit or miss proposition. 7
The unchecked use of adjudication to develop policies and the lack
of meaningful access to agency orders are interrelated problems.
Agencies may use case-by-case adjudications to announce and to re-
fine new policy over time. But because agencies generally have failed
to compile and to maintain useful subject matter indexes of those or-
ders resulting from adjudications, the people who need to know an
agency's position on a given issue cannot find it. If rulemaking were
required, the agency's position could be found in the Florida Admin-
istrative Code. Similarly, if keeping a useful subject matter index and
requiring accessibility to final orders were mandated, the agency's po-
sition could be found in its final orders.
For the past several years, academics, the state administrative law
bar, and the Florida Legislature have struggled to find solutions to
both problems. How can we limit the discretion courts have given
agencies to decide whether and when they will adopt policy statements
as rules? How can we make final orders accessible and available to
those who need them?
The academics have written articles.8 The Bar has convened confer-
6. Ch. 74-310, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 952, 955 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(b)-
(c) (1989)).
7. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON GOVTL. Ops., A REVIEw OF INDEXING OF AGENCY ORDERS
ISSUED PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 120, F.S., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 5-7 (Apr. 1989)
(on file with comm.).
8. See Bonfield, Mandating State Agency Lawmaking by Rule, 2 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 161
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ences. 9 The Legislature has debated the various suggestions offered by
the scholars and the Bar-as well as some of their own-all to no
avail. 10 Finally, during the 1991 Regular Session, all the pieces fell into
place. The Legislature passed one bill that addressed both questions."
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The House in 1991-as it did in 1990-took the lead on the ques-
tion of limiting agency discretion in deciding whether to adopt rules,
and the Senate spearheaded the effort to make agency final orders
accessible and available. 2 But unlike in 1990, in 1991 both houses
came together on both questions in the end.
The House bill began as an interim project by the House Govern-
mental Operations Committee. What was to become Proposed Com-
mittee Bill 91-01, the House's Administrative Procedure Act Bill, was
developed through a series of workshops conducted by the Subcom-
mittee on Governmental Effectiveness. The subcommittee considered
preliminary drafts of the proposed committee bill in workshops on
January 8, January 23, and February 6, 1991."
(1988); Bonfield, State Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking Meth-
odology, 42 ADum.. L. REv. 121 (1990); Burris, The Failure of the Florida Judicial Review
Process to Provide Effective Incentives for Agency Rulemaking, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 662
(1991); Dore, Seventh Administrative Law Conference Agenda and Report, 18 FLA. ST. U.L.
Rav. 703 (1991); Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act After 15 Years, 18 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 749 (1991).
9. Both the Sixth and the Seventh Administrative Law Conferences sponsored by the Ad-
ministrative Law Section of the Florida Bar were devoted to discussion of these questions. See
generally The Seventh Administrative Law Conference, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. Ray. 607 (1991) (sym-
posium issue).
10. The Senate passed Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1334 (1989), dealing with sub-
ject matter indexing and the availability of agency orders, in 1989. See FIA. S. JoUt. 503 (Reg.
Sess. 1989). The House did not take up the bill, and it died upon adjournment sine die. FIA.
LEGis., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1989 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 209, CS
for SB 1334. In 1990, the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations favorably reported
Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 2550, that session's version of the subject matter indexing
bill. But the bill was pulled into the Senate Committee on Appropriations, where it died upon
adjournment sine die of the 1990 Regular Session. See FLA. LEGIs., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION,
1990 REGuLAR SEssION, HISTORY OF SENATE Bn.Ls at 204, CS for SB 2550. The House passed
Committee Substitute for House Bill 2539, dealing with a requirement that agencies adopt policy
statements as rules as soon as feasible and practicable, in 1990. See FLA. H.R. Joul. 785, 786
(Reg. Sess. 1990). The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations,
where it died upon adjournment sine die of the 1990 Regular Session. See FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY
OF LEGISLATION, 1990 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HousE Bn.LS at 419, CS for HB 2539.
11. Fla. CS for HB 1879(1991).
12. See Dore, supra note 8, at 707.
13. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Governmental Effectiveness, un-
paginated transcript of proceedings (Jan. 8, 1991) (on file with comm.); Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Govtl. Effectiveness, unpaginated transcript of proceedings (Feb. 6,
1991) (on file with committee).
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The preliminary draft the subcommittee had before it at the Febru-
ary 6 workshop contained a controversial provision repealing the so-
called "shield" that protects rules adopted to implement the growth
management law from validity challenges under chapter 120.14 Repre-
sentative C. Fred Jones 5 was behind the idea of placing the "shield"
repealer provision in Proposed Committee Bill 91-01, but he had the
support of Speaker T.K. Wetherell.' 6 The "shield" itself is perceived
by some, principally developers and home builders, as a denial of the
rights to be heard and to contest important public policy decisions
having statewide significance-rights otherwise available to people
who will be substantially affected by agency policy decisions. The is-
sue became especially controversial in 1989 when the Department of
Community Affairs rejected Charlotte County's comprehensive plan
because the plan failed to conform with the department's unadopted
urban sprawl policies . 7 Urban sprawl became the most highly visible
and politically charged example of an agency's refusal to promulgate
rules on a sensitive subject while at the same time applying its policy
against urban sprawl to individual cities and counties while reviewing
their comprehensive plans. More would have been done to prohibit
future examples of the urban sprawl policy by passing a bill similar to
the February 6 draft before the subcommittee without a "shield" re-
pealer than could be done by repealing the "shield."' 8 But the
"shield" had become a symbol in the battle concerning urban sprawl,
and in politics symbolism sometimes masquerades as realism. In any
event, so long as the "shield" repealer was in the bill, it would be seen
as a growth management bill and not as a bill limiting agency discre-
tion to develop policy through adjudication rather than through rule-
making.
The subcommittee and the committee held back-to-back meetings
on February 20, 1991. They met the same morning the St. Petersburg
Times ran a scathing editorial calling the "shield" repealer a "back-
14. The provision was a single sentence that read: "Effective October 1, 1992, paragraph
(k) of subsection (10) of section 163.3177, Florida Statutes, is hereby repealed." Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Govtl. Ops., PCB 91-01, § 3 (draft of Feb. 6, 1991).
15. Dem., Auburndale.
16. Dem., Daytona Beach.
17. See Hyde, Legislative Shields to Rulemaking, 12 ADrN3. L. SEc. NEWSL. 1, 3-4 (May
1991).
18. All versions of the House bill contained language requiring agencies to adopt their poli-
cies as rules as soon as feasible and practicable. See infra notes 58-85 and accompanying text.
The "shield" only protects the growth management rules as they existed before October 1, 1986.
See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(k) (1989). So without doing anything to the "shield," the Legisla-
ture could be sure that any future policy developments would be subject to the rulemaking re-
quirements in the House bill, if the bill became law.
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door attack" on the growth management law and questioning the mo-
tives of both Wetherell and Jones.' 9 At its meeting, the subcommittee
adopted an amendment offered by Representative Press2 that struck
everything after the enacting clause and substituted language that had
been developed since the February 6, 1991 workshop. 2' The "shield"
repealer language was still in the bill.
By the time the full committee took up Proposed Committee Bill
91-01 later that same day, lobbyists representing both development
and environmental interests had agreed to a compromise on the
"shield" repealer language. 22 The committee accepted the compromise
and reported the bill favorably as amended. 23 The bill was filed as
House Bill 1879 and referred to the House Appropriations Commit-
tee.2 The Appropriations Committee reported the bill favorably with
two amendments. 25 House Bill 1879 was then placed on the Special.
Order Calendar, read the second time, and the two amendments rec-
ommended by the Appropriations Committee were adopted. 26 A third
amendment that removed all reference to the "shield" was also
adopted.27 House Bill 1879 was read the third time and passed as
amended by the House on March 19, 1991.28
In the Senate, Senator Curt Kiser29 filed Senate Bill 900, which ad-
dressed indexing and availability of agency final orders. The bill was
19. The Big Wink, St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at 12A, col.l.
20. Dem., Delray Beach.
21. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Governmental Effectiveness, unpagin-
ated draft transcript of proceedings (Feb. 20, 1991) (on file with comm.).
22. Robert Rhodes, representing the Florida Home Builders Association, and Casey Gluck-
man, representing the Audubon Society, were the principal architects of the compromise. See
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., draft transcript of proceedings at 11, 17 (Feb. 20, 1991) (on
file with comm.).
23. Id. at 22.
24. FLA. H.R. JouR. 71 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 6, 1991).
25. Id. at 130 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 12, 1991).
26. Id. at 153 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 13, 1991).
27. Id. The amendment striking the controversial "shield" language was offered by Repre-
sentatives Mary Figg, Democrat, Lutz; C. Fred Jones; and Michael Friedman, Democrat, Surf-
side. Jones received a commitment from William Sadowski, Secretary of the Department of
Community Affairs, that the growth management rules would be thoroughly analyzed "to deter-
mine, among other things, whether a revision or additional rules are necessary in order to con-
tinue review of local government comprehensive plan amendments and to conduct future reviews
of evaluation and appraisal reports submitted to the Department by local governments." Letter
from William E. Sadowski, Sec'y Dep't of Comm'y Affairs, to Rep. C. Fred Jones (Mar. 13,
1991) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Comm'y Affairs). As part of the thorough review,
several workshops were scheduled around the state during May and June to receive citizen com-
ments on the current growth management rules. Letter from William E. Sadowski, Sec'y Dep't
of Comm'y Affairs, to Hon. C. Fred Jones (Apr. 30, 1991) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Comm'y Affairs).
28. FLA. H.R. Jou. 209, 210 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 19, 1991).
29. Repub., Palm Harbor.
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referred to three Senate committees- Governmental Operations,
Community Affairs, and Appropriations.30 The Senate Committee on
Governmental Operations reported it favorably on March 14, 1991.31
Senate Bill 900 was withdrawn from Community Affairs on March
19, 199132 and later withdrawn from Appropriations.-3 The Senate
passed the bill on April 9, 1991. 34 Upon receiving it, the House re-
ferred the bill to its own Committee on Governmental Operations.
35
Senate Bill 900 was not taken up in the House and died in committee
on adjournment sine die.36 The Senate then adopted the complete bill
again, this time as an amendment to House Bill 1879. 37
Out of concern that the growth management rules "shield" repealer
provision would doom passage of House Bill 1879, Senators Kenneth
Jenne3 8 and Curt Kiser on March 8, 1991, filed Senate Bill 1836, which
replicated the House bill in all respects except for the "shield" re-
pealer. 39 Senate Bill 1836 was referred to the Senate Committees on
Governmental Operations, Judiciary-Civil, and Appropriations. 4 The
bill was amended by the Senate Governmental Operations Committee
and reported favorably as Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1836
on April 2, 1991.41 It was withdrawn from Judiciary-Civil and Appro-
priations on the same day42 and placed on the Special Order Calen-
dar.43
After the House passed House Bill 1879, it too was referred to the
Senate Committees on Governmental Operations, Judiciary-Civil, and
Appropriations." It was later withdrawn from all three committees,
substituted for Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1836, amended
on the floor, and passed by the Senate.45 The House concurred with
the Senate amendments, and the bill was engrossed and enrolled.4
30. FLA. S. JouR. 48 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 5, 1991).
31. Id. at 109 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 14, 1991).
32. Id. at 170 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 19, 1991).
33. Id. at 195 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 27, 1991).
34. Id. at 307 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 9, 1991).
35. FLA. H.R. JouR. 497 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 11, 1991).
36. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1991 REGUI.AR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 94, SB 900.
37. FLA. S. JOUR. 345, 349 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 9, 1991).
38. Dem., Fort Lauderdale.
39. FLA. LEOS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1991 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 158, SB 1836.
40. FLA. S. JoUR. 122 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 14, 1991).
41. Id. at 218 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 12, 1991).
42. Id. at 232 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 12, 1991).
43. Id. at 309 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 9, 1991).
44. Id. at 196 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 27, 1991).
45. Id. at 308 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 9, 1991).
46. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 576 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 16, 1991).
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The bill then became law without the Governor's signature on April
27, 1991.7
Indeed, a gubernatorial veto had been a real possibility. To head
that off, the Governor's Office and the legislative leadership agreedO
to pass another bill delaying the effective date of House Bill 1879
from January 1, 1992, to March 1, 1992. The rules were waived to
allow the late introduction and passage of Senate Bill 2504 on April
29, 1991.49 The process was just as expeditious in the House, where
Senate Bill 2504 was received, placed on the Special Order Calendar,
read the second and third times, and passed on May 1, 1991.50 The bill
became law with the Governor's signature.5' By delaying the effective
date of chapter 91-3052 for sixty days, the executive branch hoped to
give the Legislature "the opportunity to reform the rule adoption pro-
cedures before the more stringent requirement for rules would take
effect. '53 No specific reforms were suggested. At the time, both sides
were referring only to the general need for "streamlining the rule
making procedures of Chapter 120."1 4 The Speaker has since asked
Representative Figg and the House Governmental Operations Com-
mittee to undertake a review of rulemaking requirements before the
1992 legislative session. The Speaker has promised that executive
branch "concerns regarding the burdensome nature of rulemaking
will be a priority of this review. Proposals to eliminate burdens associ-
ated with rule adoption will receive prominent consideration and legis-
lation to implement appropriate reforms introduced." 55
III. ANALYSIS OF THE 1991 LEGISLATION
Chapter 91-30 dramatically alters two important aspects of adminis-
trative practice. First, it legislatively reverses the judicially created
doctrine that permits agencies to decide whether and when they will
47. Ch. 91-30, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 200.
48. They reached this agreement in a meeting between Lieutenant Governor Buddy
MacKay, Senators Jenne and Kiser, Representative Figg, and key legislative and executive staff.
Telephone interview with David Nam, Legis. Analyst, H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops. (Oct. 15,
1991) (notes on file, Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
49. FLA. S. Jotu. 1126, 1149 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 29, 1991).
50. FLA. H.R. Jout. 1896 (Reg. Sess. May 1, 1991).
51. Ch. 91-191, 1991 Fla. Laws 1285.
52. 1991 Fla. Laws 191.
53. Letter from Buddy MacKay, Lt. Gov., to Gwen Margolis, S. Pres., and T.K. Wetherell,
H.R. Speaker (June 24, 1991) (on file with Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops.).
54. Id.
55. Letter from T.K. Wetherell, H.R. Speaker, to Buddy MacKay, Lt. Gov. (July 11, 1991)
(on file with House Speaker's Office).
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formalize policy choices through rulemaking. 6 Second, it establishes
clearer guidelines concerning which agency orders must be indexed
and which must be made available for public inspection. 7
A. Rule Adoption Is Not a Matter of Agency Discretion
Chapter 91-30 creates a new section 120.535 entitled "Rulemaking
required.' ' 8 The first sentence in the new section states that
"[riulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion."' 59 That sentence is
intended to proclaim in clear and unambiguous terms that the Legisla-
ture disagrees with and intends to change the court developed notion
that rulemaking is a matter of agency discretion. 60 The discretion be-
longs to the Legislature, and in section 120.535 the Legislature estab-
lishes that agency statements that fit the definition of a rule provided
in section 120.52(16) "shall be adopted by the rulemaking procedure
provided.., as soon as feasible and practicable." 6' Furthermore, the
Legislature created a presumption that rulemaking is feasible and
practicable. The presumption of feasibility is rebutted if an agency
proves the existence of one of three conditions:
1. The agency has not had sufficient time to acquire the knowledge
and experience reasonably necessary to address a statement by
rulemaking; or
2. Related matters are not sufficiently resolved to enable the agency
to address a statement by rulemaking; or
3. The agency is currently using the rulemaking procedure
expeditiously and in good faith to adopt rules which address the
statement. 62
56. See Dore, supra note 8, at 708-11 for a detailed discussion of this problem.
57. See id. at 715-18 for a detailed discussion of this problem.
58. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 191,194.
59. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1)).
60. The preliminary drafts of Proposed Committee Bill 91-1 had both a different tag line
and first sentence. In the preliminary drafts the tag line was "Required Rulemaking" and the
first sentence was "Each agency statement defined as a rule under s. 120.52(16) shall be adopted
by the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54 as soon as feasible and to the extent practica-
ble." Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Govti. Effectiveness, PCB 91-1 (draft of
Jan. 7, 1991) (proposed FLA. STAT. 120.535); Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on
Governmental Effectiveness, PCB 91-1 (draft of Feb. 6, 1991) (proposed FLA.. STAT. 120.535(1)).
The tag line was changed to "Rulemaking required" and "Rulemaking is not a matter of agency
discretion" became the new first sentence by an amendment offered by Representative Steve
Press to PCB 91-1 at the February 20, 1991, meeting of the Subcommittee on Governmental
Effectiveness. The author suggested both changes to David Nam, the staff person responsible for
drafting PCB 91-1.
61. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 194 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1)).
62. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1)(a)1-3). The preliminary drafts of Pro-
APA REVISIONS
An agency can demonstrate that rulemaking is not practicable if it
proves that:
1. Detail or precision in the establishment of principles, criteria, or
standards for agency decisions is not reasonable under the
circumstances; or
2. The particular questions addressed are of such a narrow scope that
more specific resolution of the matter is impractical outside of an
adjudication to determine the substantial interests of a party based
on individual circumstances.63
These five criteria are intended to be exclusive. When an agency's
statement is challenged, its failure to rulemake can therefore be ex-
cused only if it proves that at least one of these criteria is satisfied.6
Although the concept of requiring rule adoption when feasible and
practicable was borrowed from the 1981 Model State Administrative
Procedure Act, 65 the specific feasibility and practicability criteria
adopted in Florida are this State's own.66
Chapter 91-30 creates a procedure, modeled after the 120.54(4) pro-
posed rule validity challenge procedure and the 120.56 rule validity
challenge procedure, to contest an agency statement believed to vio-
late the required rulemaking standards of section 120.535(1). "Any
person substantially affected by an agency statement may seek an ad-
ministrative determination that the statement violates subsection
(1)."67 The challenger initiates the process by filing a written petition
with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). The petition
posed Committee Bill 91-1 did not contain a presumption that rulemaking is feasible and practi-
cable unless the agency proved that one of five conditions existed. Rather, the preliminary drafts
presented a list of factors to be considered by hearing officers and courts when deciding whether
rulemaking was feasible and practicable. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Gov-
ernmental Effectiveness, PCB 91-1 (draft of Jan. 7, 1991) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.535(l)(a)-
(c), (2)(a)-(b)); Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Subcomm. on Govtl. Effectiveness, PCB 91-1
(draft of Feb. 6, 1991) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.535(l)(a)1-7, (b)l-4). Representative Press
was troubled by this approach and persistently questioned staff and other participants about it
during the subcommittee workshop on February 6, 1991. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops.,
Subcomm. on Govtl. Effectiveness, unpaginated transcript of proceedings (Feb. 6, 1991)(on file
with comm.). The approach reflected in chapter 91-30 was the result of an amendment to PCB
91-1 offered by Representative Press at the Subcommittee on Governmental Effectiveness meet-
ing on February 20, 1991.
63. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 194 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
120.535(l)(b)1,2).
64. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., HB 1879 (1991) Staff Analysis 4 (final May
22, 1991) (on file with comm.).
65. MODaL STATE ADmN. PROCEDURE ACT § 2-104 (1981), 15 U.L.A. 28 (1990).
66. See Dore, supra note 8, at 712 n.45.
67. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 194 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(2)(a)).
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must allege facts showing that the petitioner is substantially affected
by the agency statement, that the statement is a rule within the mean-
ing of the section 120.52(16) definition of rule, and that the agency
has not followed the section 120.54 rulemaking procedures. In addi-
tion, the petition must include either the text of the agency statement
or a description of it.6
Immediately after receiving the petition, DOAH must send copies
of it to the agency whose statement is in question, to the Department
of State, and to the Legislature's Joint Administrative Procedures
Committee (JAPC). The Department of State must publish notice of
the petition, including the text or description of the challenged agency
statement, in the first available issue of the Florida Administrative
Weekly. If the petition is facially adequate, the DOAH director must
assign a hearing officer within ten days of receiving the petition. The
Division of Administrative Hearings then is to hold a hearing within
thirty days, unless the petition is withdrawn or the hearing date is ex-
tended for good cause. If the petitioner succeeds in proving the allega-
tions at the hearing, the burden falls on the agency to prove that
rulemaking is not feasible or practicable under the criteria specified in
section 120.535(1).69
The hearing officer must render a written decision within thirty
days of the hearing. This decision is a final order subject only to judi-
cial review. 70 The Division of Administrative Hearings must send cop-
ies of the final order to the JAPC and to the Department of State,
which must publish notice of it in the first available issue of the Flor-
ida Administrative Weekly.7'
68. Id. (to be codified at FiA. STAT. § 120.535(2)(a)1-3).
69. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(2)(b)),
70. Chapter 91-30 amends section 120.68 to provide that filing notice of appeal from a
hearing officer's final order after a section 120.535 proceeding does not automatically stay the
hearing officer's final order. A stay may be sought by an agency and may be granted by a court
if it is "necessary to avoid a probable danger to the public health, safety, or welfare." Ch. 91-
30, § 6, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3)(b)). The Legislature's
concerns about an automatic stay when an agency files notice of appeal were spelled out this
way:
If an agency received an automatic stay of a s. 120.535 order upon filing a petition for
review, the Legislature's policy in favor of rulemaking would be frustrated while the
case is on appeal. Agencies could simply appeal an adverse determination and avoid
rulemaking. An automatic stay could create an incentive for appellate litigation.
Agencies might misallocate finite resources in favor of appellate litigation and not
provide appropriate levels of resources for rulemaking.
Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., HB 1879 (1991) Staff Analysis 9 (final May 22, 1991)
(on file with comm.). Nevertheless, the provision may be an unconstitutional encroachment by
the Legislature on the Florida Supreme Court's exclusive authority to adopt rules of procedure
for the courts. See FiA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a); City of Jacksonville Beach v. Public Empls. Rels.
Comm'n, 359 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. Ist DCA 1978), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1979).
71. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 195 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(3)).
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If the hearing officer determines that the agency statement is a rule
that has not been adopted following 120.54 rulemaking procedures
and also finds that it is feasible and practicable for the agency to
adopt the statement as a rule, the agency cannot rely either on its
statement or on anything substantially similar to support any agency
decision. 72 However, an agency may continue to rely on its statement
as a basis for agency decision if it publishes notice of intent to adopt a
rule that addresses the substance of the statement and if it "proceeds
expeditiously and in good faith ' 73 to adopt the rule. 74 If the agency
does not adopt the rule within 180 days of the date it publishes notice
of intent to adopt, the agency is presumed to be not acting expedi-
tiously and in good faith. The 180 day period is tolled until a final
order is rendered if the proposed rule is challenged in a 120.54(4) pro-
ceeding."1
Chapter 91-30 also provides for the payment of costs and attorneys'
fees incurred by substantially affected persons who successfully chal-
lenge agency statements previously invalidated in 120.535 proceedings.
The challenger must prove that the agency was not entitled to rely on
the invalidated statement, yet continued to do S0.76 Presumably the
case would be made if the person proved that the statement had been
invalidated and further proved that the agency had not published no-
tice of intent to adopt a rule to replace the statement. One seeking
attorneys' fees might also succeed by proving that more than 180 days
had passed since notice to adopt was published and that the rule had
not been adopted and was not the subject of a 120.54(4) challenge.
A person may recover costs and fees by filing a petition under
120.57(1) or 120.535. 7 Practitioners will probably prefer using
72. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(4)).
73. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(5)).
74. Id. This provision was amended by the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations.
The original provision permitted an agency to rely on a "statement as a basis for agency action if
the statement [met] the requirements of s. 120.57(l)(b)15." Fla. SB 1836, § 1 (1991) (proposed
FLA. STAT. § 120.535(5)). The explicit cross reference to the requirements of new subsection
120.57(l)(b)15 was deleted, but the deletion is not expected to undercut the section
120,57(1)(b)15 requirements for the use of policy not adopted as a rule. See Staff of Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Govtl. Ops., HB 1879 (1991) Staff Analysis 14 (final May 22, 1991) (on file with
comm.). See also infra text accompanying notes 86-91 for a discussion of section 120.57(l)(b)15.
75. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 195 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(5)).
76. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(6)). This provision was amended by the
Senate Committee on Governmental Operations by deleting the word "all" before "reasonable
costs and attorney's fees." Fla. SB 1836, § 1 (1991) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.535(6)). As
amended, the provision now allows for full or partial recovery of costs and fees. See Staff of
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., HB 1879 (1991) Staff Analysis 14 (final May 22, 1991) (on file
with comm.).
77. Id.
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120.535 because it offers two advantages. First, the petition is filed
directly with DOAH and the hearing is conducted by a DOAH hear-
ing officer. 78 Petitions filed under 120.57(1), on the other hand, are
filed with the agency and the agency head decides whether to forward
the petition to DOAH for hearing or to conduct the hearing himself
or herself. 79 Second, the DOAH hearing officer's decision in a 120.535
proceeding is a final order, 80 and not-as under 120.57(1)-a recom-
mended order that may be modified or changed by the agency's final
order.8' To underscore the importance the Legislature attaches to
agency rulemaking, any amount awarded for costs and attorneys' fees
must be paid directly from the budget of the agency's highest adminis-
trator. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the agency
may not be reimbursed for the payment of these costs and fees.8 2
An amendment adopted by the Senate Committee on Governmental
Operations makes prisoners ineligible to challenge an agency state-
ment believed to violate the required rulemaking standards of section
120.535(1).83 Consequently, prisoners will not be able to challenge
statements by the Department of Corrections. Courts are unlikely,
however, to construe this provision to prohibit prisoner challenges to
statements of other agencies affecting their substantial interests.8
Section 120.535 should go a long way toward reversing undue
agency reliance on case-by-case adjudication to announce policy.
What started out as a justifiable exception to rulemaking for "incipi-
ent" policy in McDonald" has become, over the years, a license for
agencies to avoid rulemaking by exercising their unbridled discretion
to do so. Section 120.535 is important because it tells the agencies and
the courts quite directly that whether and when agencies use the rule-
making process is not a matter of agency discretion. As reflected in
section 120.535, it is a legislative judgment that rulemaking is required
in all instances when it is feasible and practicable. The criteria for de-
termining feasibility and practicability are sufficiently narrow to con-
fine the use of unadopted policy to those circumstances when policy is
truly incipient in the original McDonald sense of the word and to
those circumstances when rulemaking simply is not practicable.
78. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(2)(b)).
79. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)3, (1)(a)l (1989).
80. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 195 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(3),(7)).
81. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)10 (1989).
82. Ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 195 (to be codified as FLA. STAT. § 120.535(6)).
83. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.535(9)). See Staff of H.R. Comm. on Govtl.
Ops., HB 1879 (1991) Staff Analysis 14 (final May 22, 1991) (on file with comm.).
84. See Department of Prof. Reg. v. Yolman, 508 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
85. 346 So. 2d 569, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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B. De Novo Review of Unadopted Policy Statements
Chapter 91-30 adds new subsection 120.57(1)(b)15.86 This provision
articulates the requirements that must be satisfied when an agency
statement within the definition of a rule, but not adopted as a rule, is
sought to be used in a 120.57(1) proceeding that will determine the
substantial interests of a party. The statement is subject to de novo
review by the hearing officer, and the review must disclose that the
statement does not "enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provi-
sion of law implemented or otherwise exceed delegated legislative au-
thority." 8 7 The agency must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the statement is "within the scope of delegated legisla-
tive authority. ' 88 Recommended and final orders involving an una-
dopted policy statement must explain both the statement and the
evidentiary support for the statement, and they must provide "a gen-
eral discussion of the justification for the statement applied."89 Sec-
tion 120.57(l)(b)10 was amended to make it clear that an agency may
not reject or modify the findings of fact made by a hearing officer
concerning the use of an unadopted policy statement. 90
Section 120.57(l)(b)15 was amended by the Senate Committee on
Governmental Operations. The original bill contained the following
language:
Each agency statement not adopted by the rulemaking procedure
provided by s. 120.54 that is relied upon by an agency to determine
the substantial interests of a party shall be subject to de novo review
by a hearing officer. An agency statement shall not be presumed
correct when reviewed by a hearing officer. A statement shall not
enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provision of law
implemented or otherwise exceed delegated legislative authority. The
statement applied as a result of a proceeding pursuant to this
subsection shall be demonstrated to be within the scope of delegated
legislative authority and that which best complies with and promotes
legislative intent. The determination of the statement to be applied as
a result of a proceeding pursuant to this subsection shall be based
exclusively on evidence of record and matters officially recognized.
Recommended and final orders pursuant to this subsection shall
provide an explanation of the statement that includes the evidentiary
86. Ch. 91-30, § 4, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 198 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)15).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 197 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)10).
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basis which supports the statement applied and a general discussion
of the justification for the statement applied.91
The italicized language, however, was removed by committee amend-
ment. The Senate sponsors agreed to this amendment to thwart oppo-
sition by the Department of Banking and Finance and the Department
of Insurance. Although the fifth sentence was redundant in as much
as 120.57(l)(b)8 already requires that "[flindings of fact shall be
based exclusively on the evidence of record and on matters officially
recognized," the other deletions greatly weakened the provision.
While not as strong as the original proposal, the current version still
provides more protection from arbitrary and excessive agency action
than existed before. The mere fact that the Legislature set specific
guidelines against which to measure the legitimacy of unadopted pol-
icy should discourage agency overreaching.
C. Subject Matter Indexing and Availability of Agency Orders92
Chapter 91-30 amends the Public Records Act 93 to make clear that
agency orders required to be indexed or listed by another section of
the law have "continuing legal significance" and must be permanently
maintained in accordance with rules promulgated by the Department
of State. 94
For the first time, chapter 120 now specifies the agency orders that
must be indexed:
a. Each final agency order resulting from a proceeding under s.
120.57(1) or (2);
b. Each final agency order rendered pursuant to s. 120.57(3) which
contains a statement of agency policy that may be the basis of future
agency decisions or that may otherwise contain a statement of
precedential value;
c. Each declaratory statement issued by an agency; and
d. Each final order resulting from a proceeding under s. 120.54(4) or
s. 120.56. 9
91. Fla. SB 1836, § 2 (1991) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)15) (emphasis added).
92. Much of the discussion in this section is taken from the author's earlier Article on the
topic because, with the exception of two provisions criticized in that Article, the language in
chapter 91-30 dealing with subject matter indexing and availability of agency orders is the same
as it was in Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 2550 in 1990. See Dore, supra note 8, at 718-21.
The discussion is repeated here for the convenience of the reader.
93. Ch. 119, FLA. STAT.
94. Ch. 91-30, § 1, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 192 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.041(2)).
95. Ch. 91-30, § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 192-93 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 120.53(2)(a)3a-d).
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Missing from that list, however, are final orders resulting from a pro-
ceeding under the newly created section 120.535. That omission re-
sulted when the subject-matter indexing provisions of chapter 91-30
were taken from Senate Bill 900, which traveled through the legislative
process independently until the very end. 96 Before the Legislature
passed House Bill 1879, a 120.535 proceeding did not exist. Now that
these proceedings do exist, it will be necessary to amend section
120.53 next session to add 120.535 final orders to the list of final or-
ders that must be indexed.
The agency must keep a list containing the names of the parties and
the number assigned to the final order rendered pursuant to 120.57(3)
if those final orders are excluded from the indexing and public inspec-
tion requirements because they do not contain policy statements or
have other precedential value. The Department of State must approve
any exclusions, 97 and while it may consider an agency's arguments, the
only orders it can approve for exclusion are those "of limited or no
precedential value, [those] that are of limited or no legal significance,
or [those] that are ministerial in nature."9 The agency must make the
list available for public inspection and copying and must maintain a
subject-matter index of all listed orders" within 120 days after the or-
der is rendered in accordance with procedures approved by the De-
partment of State.100 Also, unless the quantity of material makes this
impractical, copies of any material incorporated by reference are to
accompany indexed or listed agency orders. If this attachment is im-
practical, the final order must contain the location of the material and
the manner in which it may be inspected or copied. I0 '
All agencies must acquire written approval from the Department of
State: (1) of the specific types of orders that may be excluded from
indexing and public inspection; (2) of the method to be used to main-
tain indexes, lists, and orders that must be indexed or listed and made
available to the public; (3) of the method by which indexes, lists, and
orders may be inspected or copied; (4) of the numbering system used
to identify orders that must be indexed or listed; and (5) of the pro-
posed rules the agency intends to adopt relating to these requirements
for indexing and making orders available to the public. 0 2 In addition,
each agency must adopt rules that specify: (1) the specific types of
96. See supra text accompanying notes 29-37.
97. Ch. 91-30, § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 193 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)4).
98. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(d)).
99. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(a)4).
100. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(b)).
101. Ch. 91-30, § 5, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 198 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.59(1)(b)).
102. Ch. 91-30, § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 193 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c)1-5).
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orders that it excludes (with the permission of the Department of
State) from indexing and public inspection; (2) the location where in-
dexes, lists, and orders may be inspected or copied, as well as the pro-
cedure to be followed when inspection or copying is requested; (3) all
systems, including any automated system, in use by the agency to
search and find orders, and how assistance and information regarding
orders may be received; and (4) the numbering system used to identify
orders.103 Orders required to be indexed or listed must be sequentially
numbered in the order they are rendered.'°4
Chapter 91-30 also addresses the problems encountered by the pub-
lic when agencies designate an official reporter to index and publish
orders. 105 Although agencies are permitted to designate an official re-
porter to satisfy the indexing and public inspection requirements,
those requirements are satisfied only if the official reporter publishes
an index of all agency orders that must be indexed and made available
for public inspection. 1' 6 The listing of all 120.57(3) orders that need
not be indexed because they have no precedential value and do not
contain policy statements may be done by a designated reporter, but
the agency is required to retain each listed order and to make it availa-
ble for public inspection.' 7 Those 120.57(3) final orders that must be
indexed because they do contain policy statements or do have prece-
dential value need not be published in full by a designated reporter.
They need only be kept by the agency and be available for public in-
spection; the official reporter has to index them and publish a synop-
sis of each one. The synopsis must contain the names of the parties;
identify any relevant rule, statute, or constitutional provision in-
volved; provide a factual summary if one is included in the order; and
summarize the final disposition. 08
Agencies are allowed to publish their own official reporters or to
contract with a publisher. In the alternative, the Department of State
may publish or contract for the publishing of agency official report-
ers. If an agency contracts with a publisher, the agency remains re-
sponsible for the "quality, timeliness, and usefulness of the
reporter."' 9 If the Department of State contracts with a publishing
103. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(e)-(h)). The law also requires agencies to
make all of their search capabilities available to the public subject to reasonable terms and con-
ditions, including a reasonable charge. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(g)). How-
ever, agencies are not required to adopt a rule disclosing this obligation to the public.
104. Ch. 91-30, § 5, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 198 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.59(l)(c)).
105. See Dore, supra note 8, at 715-18.
106. Ch. 91-30, § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 194 (to be codified at FA. STAT. § 120.53(4)(a)).
107. Id.
108. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.53(4)(d)).
109. Id. (to be codified at FA. STAT. § 120.53(4)(b)).
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firm, the Department is responsible for quality, timeliness, and useful-
ness. 110
Because the Department of State has responsibility for preserving
and protecting official state records and other materials denominated
public records by law, the Legislature vested it with supervisory au-
thority over all other agencies' compliance with the new directives re-
lating to subject matter indexing and availability of agency orders. As
a result, the Department of State has broad new authority to control
and to monitor all agencies' implementation of the new legislative re-
quirements. As of July 1, 1992, the Department of State will have the
following responsibilities: (1) to "[a]dminister the coordination of the
indexing, management, preservation, and availability of agency orders
that must be indexed or listed";'" (2) to adopt rules that provide crite-
ria for indexing agency orders; (3) to adopt rules that establish storage
and retrieval systems through which agencies will make agency orders
available to the public by subject matter; (4) to determine which final
orders must be indexed by each agency; (5) to require each agency to
report to it those types of agency orders that establish precedent for
that agency; (6) to require each agency to adopt rules that establish
indexing procedures for all final orders required to be indexed, that
establish a sequential numbering system for agency orders, and that
establish procedures for the permanent preservation of all agency or-
ders required to be indexed and procedures for making those orders
available to the public; (7) to develop, monitor, and ensure agency
compliance with all procedures established for indexing, managing,
preserving, and making final orders available to the public; (8) to de-
velop and offer a training program to assist agencies in meeting their
indexing, managing, and preserving responsibilities; and (9) to provide
technical assistance at the request of agencies. 1 2
In addition to everything the Department of State will be doing to
improve the accessibility and availability of agency final orders, the
Legislature also authorized DOAH to undertake a study and pilot
project that will lead to a full text retrieval system. This pilot project
will focus on full text retrieval of recommended orders, as well as on
final orders and declaratory statements."' If the DOAH pilot project
proves workable and financially reasonable, it will make subject mat-
ter indexing a thing of the past. Until that time, the combined efforts
of DOAH and the Department of State at least give reason to hope
110. Id.
111. Ch. 91-30, § 9, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 199.
112. Id. at 199-200.
113. Ch. 91-30, § 7, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 199.
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that in the not too distant future, the wealth of information buried in
inaccessible and unavailable agency final orders will finally surface.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the enactment of chapter 91-30, the Legislature addressed the
two most significant problems facing people involved with Florida ad-
ministrative practice today. First, it established more specific guide-
lines concerning which agency final orders must be indexed by subject
matter and be made available for public inspection and use. Agency
adherence to these guidelines under the watchful supervision of the
Department of State should vastly improve accessibility to final
agency orders. Second, the Legislature determined that all agency pol-
icy statements that satisfy the definition of rule in the statute must be
adopted as rules following the regular rulemaking procedures as soon
as feasible and practicable. This legislation provides standards for
judging feasibility and practicability that should give agencies the flex-
ibility they legitimately need. At the same time, people who are most
interested in and affected by policy developments should once again
be able to participate in policy formulation through the various rule-
making proceedings available under chapter 120.
The Legislature will surely have to face the issue of public participa-
tion in rulemaking when it convenes in Regular Session in January
1992. The Governor's Office will recommend that some changes be
made to the rulemaking process to make it less burdensome on execu-
tive branch agencies." 4 Although the Legislature will certainly enter-
tain any suggestions made by the Governor, it seems likely that, with
the 1991 legislative reforms in place, the Governor will have to carry
the burden of persuading the Legislature that any specific reforms of
114. The early indications are that the Governor's Office may be interested in pursuing the
following changes to the rulemaking process: (1) repealing the 120.54(4) proposed rule validity
challenge proceeding; (2) repealing the requirement that economic impact statements be prepared
for all rules; (3) enacting specific statutory recognition that any procedural errors in the rule-
making process be judged by a harmless error standard; (4) limiting the right to challenge the
adequacy of documents supporting a rule-for example, the small and minority business impact
statement-to those persons who are substantially affected by the adequacy of the document
they want to challenge; (5) precluding prisoners from challenging the validity of proposed or
adopted rules; (6) prohibiting the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee from filing an
objection if the objection is raised more than six months after the rule becomes effective; (7)
clarifying the definition of rule to make clear that it does not apply to internally developed
guidelines to be used by agency personnel when they interpret or implement an agency's rules or
statutes; and (8) providing that when a rule refers to a specific federal or state statute, the refer-
ence be deemed to refer to the most current version of the referenced law. Letter from Buddy
MacKay, Lt. Gov., to Rep. Mary Figg (Aug. 14, 1991) (on file with H.R. Comm. on Govtl.
Ops.).
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the rulemaking process designed to enhance administrative efficiency
do not unacceptably abridge citizen participation. In the final analy-
sis, it is the Legislature that holds the veto pen as the 1992 Regular
Session approaches.

